1 The "China question"
Personally, I am inclined to date the beginning of economic reform in China as 1980. I saw no sign of reform when re-visiting Guangzhou in the fall of 1979 after many years away. Beijing officials and future historians will no doubt choose 1978 as the beginning. Here one can be exact: 22 December 1978. On that day, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China announced a decision of immense importance. With this dating the present conference on China, arranged by Ronald Coase, takes on a special meaning: It marks the 30th anniversary of what must be the greatest program for economic reform in history.
The 3rd Plenary Session decided on two things. First, China was to open up to advance economic development; second, Deng Xiaoping was restored to power. At the time, not many people gave credence to the proclamations. On economic matters, similar ambitions had been expressed before. As to Deng's return to power, this was his third time. Though Deng was explicitly invested with top powers, there were comrades senior to him who opposed market economics, and seniority was something that counted in China in 1978. Who could tell what may happen? Deng may soon be down again.
In the summer of 1979, Arthur Seldon of the Institute of Economic Affairs asked me to write on China's economic prospects. He said the Thatcher administration was interested in an academic analysis. I went to Guangzhou in the fall and have followed with increasing interest China's economic development and transformation ever since. In 1981, I came to the realization that constraints were changing sharply in the country and wrote for Arthur a piece long enough to be a pamphlet. Published in 1982, Will China Go Capitalist? 1 predicted in no uncertain terms: Yes, China will go capitalist! The year's delay was caused by criticisms from friends and colleagues. Yoram Barzel, my closest colleague in Seattle, disagreed with the answer, but he felt that the theoretical section was so good that it would be a shame if the manuscript did not go into print.
In retrospect, the accuracy of my prediction surprised friends and colleagues, and I myself have been surprised by the speed of change that followed. Nearly 30 years of continuous and rapid economic growth have surpassed the Meiji Restoration era in Japan, and occurring in a country as large, as populous, and as complex as China, it is almost beyond belief. Moreover, as this miracle unfolded the Chinese had to contend with corruption, a D-grade judicial system, controls on freedom of speech and beliefs, education and health care which were neither public nor private, exchange controls, inconsistent policies, and 60,000 so-called riots a year. With the exception of the riot statistics -which begs a definition, as friends in different areas told me they were unable to see anything they would call a "riot" -all the above negative things really happened.
Around 2003, several friends who knew China well complained to me regarding the country's ills and shortcomings. I replied:
Do not tell me what is wrong. I can write a thick book on what is wrong by next week. Yet despite all the problems, China has grown at such high rates and over such a long period that there is no parallel in history. Especially, do not repeat what some people believe, that corruption is good for economic development. Zhu Rongji's efforts flatly reject that hypothesis. China must have done something supremely right to produce the economic miracle we observe. What is it? That is the real question.
I explained to my friends what had puzzled me for some years in terms of the following parable. A high jumper, in the eyes of the experts, seems not to know what to do. He stumbles around and his style is clumsy. Yet he manages to jump eight feet, a world record. The man must have done something right, more right than all jumpers before. What is it? That, in a different context, is the China question. This paper attempts an answer. It is long and involved, as I have a history to relate and a theory to explain. To do this, I must focus on what China has done right. It suffices here to repeat again that if need be, I could write many books detailing the wrongs.
An economic miracle China truly is, since 1980. Milton Friedman once hailed the economic miracle of Hong Kong, for though its population increased 10-folds since the war, per-capita income still increased significantly. Yet the City of Shenzhen just north of Hong Kong achieved a higher growth rate, with a population which went up 45 times during a similar time span. To take another example: After five years, I could recognize hardly anything when re-visiting the town of Shaoxing. Migrant workers are reported not to be able to find their own homes when returning after a lapse of just three years. Some cities deep in the Chinese mainland resemble San Francisco, with sparkling night lights on highrise buildings. Currently, more than half of the world's new elevators are being installed in China.
Highways are constructed in China at a rate exceeding 4,000 kilometers a year, long enough to span the entire United States. In the mid-1990s, 17% of the world's construction cranes can be found in Shanghai. Sharply falling property prices notwithstanding, welders can be seen laboring on high-rise structures at midnight, like stars in the sky. More office space was built in Shanghai in five years than fast-growing Hong Kong managed in 1950s. In 2002 Shanghai planners abruptly restricted building heights, because they found the city sinking under the weight of real estate. The four-lane highway between Shanghai and Nanjing, empty when newly built and criticized for being a waste of money, became so congested and earned so much in tolls that five years later work was begun to double its capacity. Because tolls are charged according to the size of trucks, overloading became so severe that some roads constructed according to world-class standards are damaged in no time. Congestion occurs at each and every seaport in the country. In 2005, the world's longest and the second longest sea crossing bridges were under construction at the same time and in the same area.
A single shoe factory in Wenzhou employs 120,000 workers. That city literally produces all of the world's lighters and Christmas lightings. Yiwu, where vendors sold goods on the streets 15 years ago, now exports more than 1,000 containers a day, with purchasing agents from Korea and Africa jamming the city and pushing office rents through the roof. Who has ever heard of several thousand shops selling nothing but socks? That is Yiwu: The wholesale malls there are so huge that I took one look and sat down, for an old man like me could not handle the distance. The town of Lecong has a road selling furniture on both sides, stretching 10 kilometers long. The large industrial village in Suzhou, so beautifully landscaped and filled with manufacturers of world-class brands and industrial structures of world-class designs, cropped up in the middle of paddy fields in five years. Hangzhou receives 40 million tourists a year. One retail shop in that city, selling a famous brand of handbags, grosses US$80,000 on an average day.
I could go on and on describing similar phenomena, but there is no point. What one needs to add, however, is a story about Pudong, or Shanghai east of the river. I took the Friedmans there in 1993. Nothing could be seen except a row of one-story shops, reportedly built to entertain Deng Xiaoping. Milton (of course) resented any such action, pointing out government development planning would fail most of the time. Yet eight years later I took an American architect to downtown Pudong, and stunned, he observed that the high rises concentrated there may well be the best in the world. The lesson is this: For a country as big and populous as China, growing at such speed, there is plenty of room for learning by doing. 2 Today, office construction continues unabated in Pudong, but at the same time many buildings stand vacant. Yet property prices there are rising. There is only one explanation for the seeming contradiction: People are waiting. They invest and wait, on the expectation that when China drops exchange and banking controls, Shanghai-Pudong will immediately become a leading financial center.
The statistics do not add up. An official friend working on them admitted that there is no way to put the figures together coherently. In 2005 Beijing substantially revised past growth rates upward, but the adjustments did not cover dramatic improvements in the quality of products and services. What is more, the growth rates reported by nearly all provinces were higher, sometimes much higher, than Beijing's calculation of the growth rate as a whole. In 2006 the City of Guangzhou reported a spectacular increase in per-capita income, but mainly because they divided total output value by the registered population and 2 When Shanghai announced plans to build a second international airport in Pudong in 1997, skeptics argued that the old airport was not even used to capacity. The new Pudong airport began operations in 1999 with one runway, which soon proved insufficient. A second runway was added in 2005, and a third runway, with an added terminal, was built in 2008. A second runway for the old airport is now under construction, so that Shanghai ended up building one additional runway every 2.5 years.
Similar stories can be told for toll roads and bridges, where money-losers soon turned into money-makers. A friend mourned his decision to sell a section of a highway which was soon loaded with traffic. The output of a small producer of instant noodles from Taiwan increased to 30 million packages per day in five years. There was a period of about six years, from 2000 to 2006, when the investor almost could not go wrong! Unfortunately, this bullish environment has been changing for the worse, and by late 2007 it is changing rapidly. ignored the several millions of unregistered floating workers. There is no question that the livelihood of peasants has gone straight up since about 2000, but official statistics show slower per-capita growth than the cities. They must have used registered population in these calculations, because nobody knows how many farm-hands have "floated" away. I believe more than one-third of the working population has been floating around the country. Not knowing the pitfalls, outside organizations have severally reported the Gini index of China to be rising dangerously. These reports miss the target by miles.
The impact of ideas
Robert Mundell, honorary citizen of Beijing and Coase admirer, on hearing that the great man is organizing a conference on China, suggested that someone should write a paper eulogizing Coase's contributions and that I should be the person to do so. I have been invited by Coase to write this lead-off paper on China's economic reforms, not on himself. However, it would still be appropriate to begin with the impact of Coasian economics. In doing so, I cannot avoid involving myself, because I alone was responsible for introducing Coase' This strange title was adopted in response to a piece I read a year earlier, written by a noted Chinese economist, Sun Yefang, on "One Thousand Rules, Ten Thousand Rules, Economic Value is the First Rule."
4 During the cultural revolution, Sun made such a statement and was imprisoned for seven years. I of course was sympathetic, but disagreed with Sun regarding his Marxian notions of value and price. My article elaborated just one point: Competition is inevitable under scarcity; to determine winners or losers criteria are essential; of the numerous criteria that can be applied, only market price entails no dissipation of rent. 5 The
The important thesis of the dissipation of rent originated in the analysis of common property resource usage, where rental value may be competed away or replaced by a higher cost of use when the resource is subject to unrestrained common exploitation. I have further argued that, so long as the market price is not used or is suppressed by policy measures, some other criteria must emerge to determine the outcome of competition, and any such criterion would lead to rent dissipation. The interpretation of economic behavior in terms of rent dissipation is truly important, but it has been neglected by the profession. In particular, I have found the approach to be very useful when analyzing constraints arising from transaction costs.
The Economic System of China argument considered various alternatives, such as allocation through queuing and seniority and showed that all led to incremental wastage in terms of rent dissipation. But not so on the criterion of market pricing, and the use of market price is uniquely associated with private property.
6
Years later I discovered that this article had been widely read in Beijing, and according to many friends it had something to do with China's later practice of charging prices for just about everything. A systematic exposition of Coase's ideas on the clear delineation of rights and transaction costs first appeared in Chinese in 1982, in a translation of my IEA paper, Will China Go Capitalist?.
7
I began Chinese writing in earnest in November 1983. "The Communist System as Viewed through the Coase Theorem," in which the example of cattle raising and wheat farming is discussed in detail, appeared in January 1984.
8
I have now written 1,500 Chinese articles, about half on economics. Pieces on economic reform and policies come to about one-third of the total. But I am no reformer. However, having nearly starved to death as a boy in Guangxi, there is no hiding the fact that after surviving to become an old man I do care. It is not important whether people agree with me, so long as they read what I write. I believe anyone who reads another's writings must to some degree be influenced.
There was no better time, no better place, and perhaps no better sales person, than this writer in popularizing the ideas of Coase to the Chinese in the 1980s. The ideological gate was beginning to swing open: Comrades knew what they had believed in did not work and were looking for something new. I was appointed to the Chair of Economics of the University of Hong Kong in May 1982, the best position at that time to follow China's development. I knew Ronald's works by heart, and people knew he was a good friend of mine.
9
I was expert on Chinese culture and history, so comrades could not tell me On the literature, see Frank H. Knight (1924) ; H. Scott Gordon (1954) ; Steven N. S. Cheung (1970 Cheung ( , 1974 . 6 Using price is costly, but as a criterion of competition it is unique in that no further rent is dissipated. For the costs of using price, see R. H. Coase (1937); George J. Stigler (1961) ; Steven N. S. Cheung (1983) . 7 张五常, 《中国会走向资本主义的道路吗？》 , 一九八二, 重刊于张五常, 《中国的前途》, 一九 八五年八月初版, 再版多次, 今天由香港花千树出版。 8 张五常, 《从科斯定律看共产政制》 , 一九八四年一月二十七日发表于《信报》 , 转刊于《卖桔 者言》 , 后者一九八四年十一月初版, 再版无数次, 今天由香港花千树出版。 9 During the 1980 American Economic Association annual meeting in Detroit, Coase urged me to return to China because he heard that the country was considering reform, and he believed I was the best person to impart knowledge on the operation of economic systems to the Chinese people. A few months later, I was informed that the Chair of Economics at the University of Hong Kong would soon be open. I was appointed to that chair in May 1982 and retired 18 years later. that I did not understand China, as they routinely told outsiders. I could write in Chinese and soon developed a style people say was popular though distinctive. On top of all this are the seminal ideas of Coase, which at that time were easy to sell. Had China then been like the China now, I would be out of luck.
First is the idea of transaction costs. Chinese living under the earlier regime were all too familiar with such chores and headaches as memorizing political slogans, waiting in line, making connections, dealing through the back-door. They had to spend hours every day doing these things. When I wrote that if these costs were reduced income would shoot up, even the most stalwart defenders of the old regime could not handle the challenge. The level of transaction costs were so high at that time, things often did not make sense. This was clear enough, but it took time and many articles to convince people that transaction costs could not be reduced unless the system was changed. I should take credit for that.
Change the system to what? This time, it was more difficult to do the convincing. The first point made in my 1979 paper, that market pricing is the only economic criterion that entails zero rent dissipation, was not difficult for people who had to stand in line for hours to comprehend, but the proposition that the use of market price is uniquely associated with private property was difficult for comrades to swallow. The word "private" did not bear a single respectable connotation in Chinese culture at that time, and "private property" was in strict contravention with the official stance of maintaining a socialist or communist state.
It was here that Coase's idea on the delineation of rights worked magic, especially since I as the scientific sales person knew that the same product can be sold with new packaging. When I took the Friedmans to meet the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 1988, Mr. Zhao lost no time in elaborating to Milton the importance of delineation of rights. This dialogue is on record, and it is in print in a number of places. I take credit for selling Coasian economics to the General Secretary. Today on Baidu, the popular Chinese Internet search engine, the "Coase Theorem" appears more than 100,000 times in translation.
What turned out to be crucial is the idea of separating ownership rights from use rights. I was able to draw on many case-examples. At that time, all land in Hong Kong was owned by the (British) Crown, and a private owner of Crown land merely held a long land lease. As a student at UCLA, I bought a small Fiat on borrowed money. I was the registered owner and the bank the legal owner, but my use of the automobile was essentially unaffected by this separation of rights. In Coase's analysis of the delineation of rights, illustrated in terms of beautiful examples in his 1960 paper, I did not see private ownership rights being important in the allocation and use of resources. 10 The issue cropped up when I turned my attention to the so-called responsibility contract, which emerged in China in early 1983. I saw that in the (logical) limit, this would amount to a contract granting the private use of resources without private title. The development of the responsibility contract is central in this paper, so I will defer a more detailed discussion to a later section. I pass on to Beijing, circa August 2006. Zhou Qiren showed me two books of mine, the collections of essays The Future of China (1985) and On China Again (1986).
11 Both were originally Hong Kong publications, but photographed and reprinted, with the fly-leaf bearing a stamp that says: For Internal Reading Only. The books were listed as internal or "secret" reading materials for Beijing comrades, and I have never been so happy to see my books pirated (reportedly 2000 copies each). The influence of Coase is clear and pervasive throughout these two collections of papers.
A general concept of contracts 12
Armen Alchian advanced the thesis that competition is implied in any society where there is scarcity, and the rules which determine winners or losers can be interpreted as property rights. As Armen's student and inspired by China's experience, I have tried to understand the world from a modified angle. In my view, competition for the use of scarce resources must be restrained for social survival, because rent dissipation under unrestrained competition would result in starvation for all. These restraints can assume a variety of forms or different structures of rights, which then define the institutional nature of the economic system. Rights structures restraining competition are of four broad types, and they generally co-exist in any society. First is the delineation of rights in terms of property, or private property rights. Second is the delineation of rights in terms of hierarchical ranking, or the comrade-seniority system which prevailed under China's previous regime.
13 Third is to restrain competition through regulation.
Finally, competition may be restrained by customs or religion. Because restraining competition implies mutually agreed actions, implicit or explicit, voluntary or involuntary, it implies the existence of contracts. The latter need not be market contracts using market prices to transfer rights. I noted in 1982 that a country's constitution is a contract.
14 Private property rights, hierarchical rankings, regulations, customs, and religion -all are in my view contractual arrangements of different types. The broad concept of contracts introduced here is essential. We may in principle classify one type of contracts as intended for the delineation of rights for the purpose of restraining competition, and another type as intended for the transfer of rights, or market contracts using market prices (though the use of market prices is also a way to restrain competition).
15 Difficulties arise because these two types of contracts are not always easy to separate, and in China the two are frequently inter-woven. We shall come to this interesting arrangement later. I have been led by my efforts to understand China to see social interaction in terms of contractual relationships. When I was in Guangzhou in 1979, I was struck by the meticulous detailing of rank in different occupations. A certain rank would entitle a comrade to share an automobile, or to an egg every other 13 In a different way, hierarchical ranking is also observed in firms in a capitalistic economy. However, the ranking of comrades in a communist system differs in important aspects with the ranking of personnel in a private firm, with the former being closer to the ranking system of a government-funded enterprise such as a public hospital or a public university. In so far as rankings go, the main point of departure from capitalistic firms is that, under communist China, a citizen did not have the right of not joining and had no right to change jobs without government approval. Freedom to choose jobs would bring about the collapse of the comrade-ranking system. When this began to emerge in the Pearl River basin in late 1983, I immediately wrote that economic reform in China had reached the point of no return. Up north, this freedom of choice did not occur until around 1992, after Deng Xiaoping toured the south in the spring of that year. 14 Steven N. S. Cheung (1982) , Hobart Paper 84, Section 2. 15 Price is a constraint which restrains competition. As Adam Smith puts it in Wealth of Nations: "Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want…" (Cannan edition, p. 18). A market price is implied.
The Economic System of China day, or to the right to buy fish without having to stand in line. These phenomena were thought provoking. My first explanation was that since people are born unequal, in a "property-less" state where everybody is equally "propertyless", human rights must be unequal in order to produce social equilibrium. It took me two years to see the deeper truth: The hierarchical rankings adopted in China are contractual restraints essential to reduce rent dissipation under competition, in a situation where the delineation of rights in terms of property is absent.
The important implication here is that economic reform in China involves a shift from a system of rights in terms of hierarchy to a system of rights in terms of property, or a change from one type of contractual arrangement for restraining competition to another type. This, I profess, is the true explanation of what has happened these 30-odd years. The fact that the Chinese managed to succeed without social upheaval may be regarded as miraculous, and as we shall see, the key to success is that they used a contract sitting in between, known as the responsibility contract. The true miracle is not only that they manage to do it, but the system they end up with. While we are on the level of general theory, let me point out that restraining competition in resource use is costly, and these costs are somewhat misleadingly called transaction costs. I have emphasized over many years that different types of transaction costs can only be separated at the margin, so that testable implications can be obtained by specifying marginal changes in these costs. I have emphasized also that it is not essential to measure transaction costs in (real) dollars and cents, because it is sufficient to measure in terms of our ability to rank transaction costs under different observable situations. No easy task, but it can be done, and I have obtained on numerous occasions predictions or explanation based on specifying observable changes in transaction costs in this sense. You may quarrel with my explanation of why better seats are underpriced (Cheung, 1997) , but over the years the accuracy of my predictions of events unfolding in China have earned such high marks that they cannot just be the results of gazing at a crystal ball.
The impossibility of separating different types of transaction costs except at the margin has forced me to broaden the concept to include all costs that do not exist in a Robinson Crusoe economy. As a result, transaction costs often exist in situations where market transactions do not exist. I prefer to use the term institution costs, or costs that exist only in a society. It is my contention that transaction/institution costs arise mainly from restraining competition in the use of scarce resources, or, in my broadened notion of contractual arrangements discussed earlier, from the requirement of using contracts to restrain competition. The upshot is that so long as competition exists, transaction/institution costs must also exist. In other words, to speak of a society without these costs entails a contradiction in terms.
In 1982, I said that if there were no transaction/institution costs there would be no market. Commenting on the Coase Theorem, I wrote:
If all transaction costs, broadly defined, were truly zero, it would have to be accepted that consumer preferences would be revealed without cost. Auctioneers and monitors would provide free all the services of gathering and collating information; workers and other factors of production would be directed freely to produce in perfect accord with consumer preference; and each consumer would receive goods and services in conformity with his preferences. The total income received by each worker (consumer), as determined costlessly by an arbitrator, would equal his marginal productivity plus a share of the rents of all resources according to any of a number of criteria costlessly agreed upon. By such reasoning the Coase result can be obtained without a market price. (Cheung 1982, Section 3) That the market exists because transaction/institution costs are not zero is a view consistent with Coase's classic analysis of the firm, and my early work on the choice of contractual arrangements (Coase 1937; Cheung 1969b) . It follows almost tautologically that markets emerge to reduce transaction costs. However, unlike explaining theater-ticket pricing or the choice of buffet-dinner arrangements, the interpretation of which requires only the specification of certain marginal changes in transaction/institution costs, to interpret complex and involved economic systems or changes in such systems entails a far higher level of difficulty.
My difficulty, which lasted for nearly 20 years, was the result of a mental block. I did not know what kind of transaction/institution costs should be introduced to interpret the existence of private property rights and the market. The broad view I have assumed indicates that these costs are everywhere, and there is no room to add anymore. Then, one night in 2001, I saw the light: We have to deduct, not to add, these costs to obtain the solution.
I then recalled a two-page paper written by Anthony Bottomley, published in 1963 (Bottomley 1963) . The author argued that pastures in Tripolitania were highly suitable for lucrative almond growing, and yet because of common ownership the land was used for cattle herding. 16 I have always been doubtful that there have ever existed valuable resources subjected to unrestrained common exploitation, but assuming this to be true, dissipation of land rent is implied. What then, would be the transaction/institution costs incurred in the use of the land for common herding in Tripolitania? The answer is the land rents dissipated! In my 1974 article on price control, I argued the dissipation of rent is a 16 In Cheung (1970) , I noted in addition "that the cost of policing investment in a tree, perennially 'attached' to the common land, is high, whereas cattle are driven home at night."
The Economic System of China transaction cost (Cheung 1974) . In the Tripolitania example the same conclusion is more difficult to draw, but on two counts the land rents dissipated would indeed be transaction/institution costs. First, rent dissipation does not exist in a one-man economy; second, cost is the highest-valued option forgone -in this case the land rents of almond tree cultivation forgone. By definition, the transaction/institution costs of converting pastures to almond cultivation, must, in total, not be less than the rent dissipated, for otherwise the conversion would have occurred. The implication followed is that if we are able to identify specific changes in these costs, then institutional change could be predicted. This is precisely what I did in 1981, when predicting that China would go "capitalist". It is clear from the above observations that if private property in land exists in Tripolitania and almond trees are grown, three results would follow. First, land rents would rise and transaction/institution costs would fall -this fall represents a deduction, and in our example it is the former partially replacing the latter. Second, the type of transaction/institution costs would change, although these costs will never reach zero. Finally, under our broad notion of using contractual arrangements to restrain competition, one type of contracts is replaced by another type. This latter is in my view the true meaning of institutional change.
The above approach may seem new and unfamiliar even to people working on neo-institutional economics, but it is essential to understand economic reform in China during the past 30 years. In particular, the knowledge I have gained on transaction/institution costs and on contractual arrangements are mainly the fruits of learning from the experience of China.
It is unfortunate that institutional change or changes in contractual arrangements do not always reduce transaction/institution costs or increase rent. Adam Smith's view that land-tenure arrangements evolved to improve efficiency is not always correct. 17 Disastrous arrangements have cropped up on many occasions during the twentieth century alone, and I sometimes harbor the thought that mankind may one day eliminate themselves by their own doing in this direction. It is extremely difficult to advance an economic theory of massive self-destruction based on the postulate of individual optimization, although I have attempted to do so on several occasions elsewhere. 18 The Dark Side of the Force, as my teacher Jack Hirshleifer entitled one of his books, may well explain the popularity of game theory in the profession. I myself do not subscribe to that approach, because I believe that economic explanation requires above all the specification of observable changes in constraints.
Fortunately, for China's economic reforms, the dark side of the force has yet to play a significant role. Whatever the future holds, at long last a great and ancient civilization is emerging from a long, dark economic tunnel. As I said, this paper attempts to answer the question: What has China done right to produce the spectacular performance we all observe?
4 Evolution of the responsibility contract Let me emphasize again: The central issue of China's economic reform involved the conversion from a system of delineating rights via comrade-ranking to a system of delineating rights in terms of property. This is the same as saying the methods used to restrain competition were changed. Or using the broad concept of contracts discussed earlier, the contractual arrangements used to restrain behavior were changed. The contracts in question are not the usual market contracts we know, but they are contracts nonetheless as they stipulate what individuals may or may not do when they compete in society.
How can a transformation from a system of comrade-ranking of rights to a system of property ranking of rights be implemented? Ideological and political considerations aside, a great difficulty cropped up in the early 1980s in that such a change implied a reshuffling of income not acceptable to the status quo. My hope at the time was that the initial transformation would produce such a sharp jump in total income that individuals experiencing a drop in ranking would be compensated by substantial absolute increases. A jump in income did occur, as several localities in southern China experienced 50% or more growth rates in 1983. Still, the transformation met with opposition from the earlier privileged. In April 1985 I wrote proposing to pay them off and buy back the comrade-ranking rights. 19 Somewhat quixotic and clearly difficult, this suggestion surprisingly received some support in Beijing. However, no such action ever took place. A different compensation scheme emerged: corruption. Corruption became widespread around mid-1984. At first I was relieved, because corruption was replacing the earlier back-door transactions. 20 This was a clear sign that the comrade-ranking system was collapsing. However, when Beijing announced in 1985 that they would introduce controls by product classification, I immediately wrote that China was on "the road to India", arguing that if rights to corrupt were to be delineated in terms of regulations, the reform process would come to a halt. 21 With this warning, supporting voices from Beijing became strong.
Controls by product classification were abandoned. I disagree with suggestions that regulated corruption would be good for economic development. Experience in China does not support this view. The fact that corruption is negatively correlated with growth falsifies the view that it contributes to growth. However, if there is any credit in corruption, then I may say in the case of China it helped to pay off the privileged and reduce their resistance to reform. I also disagree with the view that corruption is everywhere in China today. It is still popular, but compared with the 1980s and the early 1990s, corruption has subsided a good deal. I know enough government officials who take pride in their work to negate the view that corruption is everywhere. Anti-corruption policies have been strong since 1993, and, as we shall see, these efforts were assisted by locality competition. My view is that compared with other Asian countries, the level of corruption in China is currently on the low side.
When transforming from one system of contractual delineation of rights to another, China was fortunate that the process was assisted at the early stage by a market contract bearing a market price. Known as the responsibility contract, it became immediately successful when applied to the use of land in agriculture. In 1986 I wrote:
The so-called "responsibility contract," if reduced to its simplest and therefore most perfect form, is equivalent to the granting of private property rights via a state lease of land. Duration of the lease may be for any number of years or, in principle, may be perpetual. Ownership is not relinquished by the state, but the rights to use the land and to obtain income are exclusively assigned to the lessee. The right to transfer, or to sell, the leased resource may take the form of subletting. Various dues exacted by the state may be lumped together in the form of a fixed rent, and since this rent is paid to the state, it becomes a property tax. If indeed a perpetual lease is assigned, then the holding becomes fee simple, and if the right is freely transferable, then the lease is held in fee simple absolute -or private property in its perfect form! (Cheung 1986) Trying to understand the development of this contract, I had the good fortune that my colleague C.H. Chai generously made available to me detailed source material collected over the years (no small effort, that), and this enabled me to publish a 1984 paper on the responsibility contract in agriculture.
22 It all began in 1958 with the rapid introduction of communes throughout the country. Massive starvation followed, and memory of this painful experience lingered for 20 years. To mitigate the effects, a number of modifications to the commune system were introduced. First was the work-point system; then came production teams; then there was a shift from large teams to small teams; and then in 1978 responsibility contracts began to emerge.
"Responsibility" may not be a completely accurate translation. In Chinese, it means "guarantee what I want and you can do what you want." At first the responsibility contract was applied to production teams, but in 1981 it was extended to households with the specification of target outputs. By 1983, the terms changed to households guaranteeing the delivery of fixed amounts and keeping the residual. The official extractions were several and complicated, but they were simplified over time, until in 2005 agricultural taxation was abolished. The government maintained the right to purchase agricultural products at controlled prices until the early 1990s. (Cheung 1986) There is no question that the responsibility contract met with great success in agriculture. Land was fairly evenly distributed among households, mostly by head count, and transfers of the right to land use for agricultural purposes were soon allowed through reassignment of responsibility contracts. However, enormous difficulties emerged when responsibility contracts were introduced in industry. In industrial production physical assets depreciate and may get stolen, and state workers could not be discharged under existing laws. Trying to get to the bottom of the difficulties, in 1985 the City of Shenzhen assigned three young men to assist my research. Sample contracts in manufacturing were promptly produced upon request. They took me to visit factories. The results from all this effort were meager. The changes were too rapid, and with contractual terms changing so frequently I was unable to produce analytically interesting generalizations. It was at this juncture, around 1985, that I strongly urged the separation of use rights and ownership rights, hoping that as a result state-owned enterprises can be more readily privatized. 23 In 1986 The Economic System of China the airport, and on the way he told me he was in the audience at Beijing Steel. He said that afterward everyone was warned not to believe my suggestion that ownership rights and use rights should separate, and that the responsibility contract with delineated use rights should be pushed to the limit. "Heroes think alike" -so the Chinese saying goes -not much later, separation of use rights and ownership rights became a pillar of what Deng Xiaoping was to call "Chinese Style Socialism." The gentleman from the Party School quietly remarked that back in 1986 he could not imagine he would ever own a computer, but now he could afford to buy a new one every other year. I was deeply moved to hear this, for old timers like us who knew what the country was like not that long ago, what has happened is more of a miracle than can be appreciated by younger people who know little of China's past. It was a long drive to the Party School, and I came to realize that the old comrade was proud of the China miracle and that there must have been many like him who stuck to their guns when the ship was taking water.
The manifestation of the responsibility contracts and the rise of the competing xians
The responsibility contract was a success in agriculture, though it took some years to modify and simplify the complicated arrangement to yield the present form of transferable land leases. In the process, the authorities gradually relinquished direct controls in favor of delineation of use rights. By the early 1990s price control was dropped, and in 2005 agricultural taxation was abolished, thus rendering the responsibility contract in agriculture the equivalent of a long land lease free of taxation. Nonetheless, it is still formally a responsibility contract. The selling of agricultural land, which in reality is a transfer of the land lease, is still called "changing responsibility." Applying the responsibility contract to industry was more of a problem. When I began to study the matter in the mid-1980s, the main difficulty lay in depreciable industrial assets. Responsibilities over maintenance and reinvestment led to frequent controversy between the authorities and state enterprises. I proposed several solutions, such as the issuance of transferable stocks. 24 This scheme was adopted in the late 1990s, but only for profitable state enterprises enjoying protected monopoly status. As for the numerous losing concerns, their physical assets were mostly depreciated to zero value by the early 1990s. In fact, by that time the authorities had difficulty giving away loss-making state-owned factories. Different times, different problems. Beginning in the 1990s, the sticking point with state enterprises no longer concerned assets -there was hardly any value left to depreciate -but that state employees cannot be discharged under law. Nevertheless, large-scale privatization of loss-making state enterprises was successfully carried out around the turn of the century, effectively assisted by a substantial rise in land prices. We shall explain what happened later.
An idea of great value was salvaged from the disappointing experience of the responsibility contract in the industrial sector. Around 1984, a layer-by-layer responsibility arrangement emerged. In essence this was subcontracting, and we know in industry how the "subs" may go down a number of layers in a chain. If we must single out one key development in China's economic reform, then my choice is that beginning from the late 1980s responsibility contracts in agriculture was combined with the layer-by-layer responsibility arrangements in industry. This is a truly significant achievement, because the combination was applied to neither individual farms nor individual state-owned enterprises, but to entities defined by geographic boundaries. In my view, this is the central feature of the economic system of China today.
For someone following the day-to-day development of this system he might find it very complex, but when the changes finally settle down and one is able to put the pieces together, the system is seen to be straightforward and rational. What happened has not been tried anywhere before. Although none of the parts are new, the way they are put together is original and effective. During the early application of responsibility contract combinations to localities, the arrangements differed in different places and changes were frequent, until around 1994 the common features of the whole became identifiable. I came to appreciate that there was something truly special about the system when I looked into the development of Kunshan in 1997. The intensity of competition among localities then was something I had never seen before. When deflation ended around 2000, locality competition became so dynamic that I did not fully decipher the workings until the end of 2004. It is true that in varying degrees, competition among localities also exists in other countries, but as we shall see, both in nature and in intensity, what is observed in China has no equal elsewhere.
Although many of the people involved were very capable, I do not believe that the system of China now in place is the result of brilliant individual efforts. The system as it stands today is rather the result of economic pressures, with many mouths to feed and the rising tide was roaring. To handle the situation, the guiding principle followed was not the popularly quoted saying of Deng Xiaoping -"feel the stones when crossing the river," but that the man of few words said: "Give it a try, and then take a look."
Let me begin the description of the locality-competing system by clearing up a matter of terminology. Each and every locality of course has a proper name, but their common names -whether city or town -are often confusing. Some of the common names are different because they were coined at different times, and today some localities are specially treated because they report directly to Beijing. I prefer my way of classifying localities, which is generally endorsed by official friends.
It is instructive to view China as consisting of seven layers, all geographically determined, with a lower layer falling inside the confines of the layer above. The top layer is the country, then comes the provinces, the cities, the xians, the towns, the villages, and finally the households. These seven layers are linked vertically by responsibility contracts, but horizontally there are no contractual linkages. Competition therefore occurs horizontally but not vertically. Entities bearing similar responsibilities compete against one other, within the same layer.
The intensity of locality competition varies positively with economic power assigned to each layer. Today, economic power by and large rests in the xians. The chief economic power does not rest in the villages or towns or cities or provinces or even Beijing but in the xians, for the reason that xians possess the right to decide and allocate the use of land. The central government in Beijing (and to a lesser extent the provincial authorities) reserve the right to define and enforce general guidelines regarding land use and other general economic and political matters. They also possess the right to shift the geographic boundaries of localities, to fire or reshuffle local officials, and to reallocate funds to assist localities under certain conditions. The right to decide and allocate land use is the key issue in a developing country. Without land there would be nothing to develop, and if land is used efficiently all other considerations become secondary. If under competition land rents are rising, the economy is growing. Technology change and the accumulation of physical and human capital are no doubt important, and the country is marching forward in these areas -right now, the growth rate of private R&D expenditure in China is the highest in the world. But technology and investment would be of little effect when people do not have enough to eat. Take care of land use, lift the masses from starvation, and then the economy can take off with the support of saving, investment, and technological change.
Efficiency in land use can be realized at different levels. Other things remaining the same and given clearly delineated use rights, how high a level is attained depends on the intensity of competition. Individuals compete, households compete, firms compete -these represent all the forms of competition traditionally analyzed in economics. In the case of China, we may add that localities within the same layer compete, and because economic power rests mainly with the xians, competition at this level is the most intense. Adding one more layer of competition is, in my view, the chief new idea in the answer to the China question.
A xian is often translated as "county". That is not correct. In China, cities are very large. An average city contains 8.6 xians. At the end of 2006, the official count was 2,860 xians or the equivalents in the whole country, so that there were this number of entities which possess a high degree of autonomy regarding land use and related economic matters. The average area of the xian is about 3,000 square kilometers with a large variance. Since population density is low in western China, the xians there tend to be very large in area. In the populous east of the country, a xian is typically in the neighborhood of 1,000 square kilometers in size. I estimate the average population per xian to be 450,000, but here again the variance is large.
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The question remains -the central question remains: Why is competition so intense among xians? Is it not true that in other countries there are different layers of localities too? Exactly what are the fundamental elements in the contractual structure of the system of China that generates intense competition, and which in turn sustains economic growth at the spectacular rates we have been observing?
6 The sharecropping nature of the xian system Economic reform in China can be divided into phases. The first dates from around 1980 to Deng Xiaoping's retirement in 1992. This phase involves mainly the delineation of rights in terms of property to replace the earlier practice of comrade-ranking, with the high point being reached on 1 December 1987 when Shenzhen auctioned land for the first time in the country. This involved selling a private long lease to use land for a specific purpose without private ownership. City officials told me they were following my advice: I had earlier suggested that selling land was just about the only way funds can be 25 The granting of economic power to xians via responsibility contracts has given rise to an interesting debate during the past few years. Should cities in China be abolished? The pros argue that while economic power rests with the xians, politically city officials are ranked higher, so that unavoidable conflict would emerge which interfere the operation of the system. This is a complicated issue which I did not tackle during my research. Beginning fiscal year 2007, xians report financial matters directly to provincial governments, skipping the cities. In other political or administrative matters, a city is still ranked higher than a xian.
The Economic System of China obtained to develop the city and that they should allow private developers to exploit private expertise.
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During this first phase, economic development was concentrated in the Pearl River basin, in the south of the country. This was a relatively neglected and underrated region during the earlier regime, with few large state enterprises or state-protected monopolies. Businessmen and investors from Hong Kong led the way, bringing in capital, technology, and management skills. Compared to the Yangtze River basin where powerful state enterprises barred competition, down in the south days and sometimes hours were all that it took to obtain a private business license.
The impact of the market began to be felt in the Yangtze River basin around 1993. Surprisingly, in only eight or nine years this area overtook the south in just about all the vital economic statistics. This marked the second phase of economic reform in China, when Zhu Ronji was in charge of the economy. The period 1993-2000 included some trying times, beginning with run-away inflation, massive corruption, the collapse of the RMB, followed by severe restrictions on borrowing and spending, crackdown on corruption, and finally by deflation and the collapse of the real-estate market. Yet it was in the midst of these difficulties that the Yangtze River basin exploded in growth, with effects which extended all the way into the mid-western part of the country. One may cite a number of reasons for this miraculous development, but in my view the key factor was that the xian-competing system finally emerged in a well-defined form and that it began to deliver results.
The odds were against the Yangtze River basin overtaking the Pearl River basin under the economic climate described above, 27 and yet this was what 26 In June 1986, I published an article discussing three advantages of selling land. Shengzhen officials liked that article and invited me to a meeting in the spring of 1987. 张五常, 《出售土地 一举三得》, 一九八六年六月二十五日于《信报》发表, 其后转刊于《再论中国》。 27 In the fall of 1988, I took the Friedmans to tour the Yangtze River basin. Milton was happy to see street vendors doing business on muddy roads and told the General Secretary (whom we later met in Beijing) that street vendors would have to bribe to obtain a license. Suzhou officials obligingly showed us their famous town-and-village enterprises, which were embarrassing. During dinner, a vice mayor of Suzhou argued with Milton on the superiority of state enterprises. In the fall of 1993, I again took the Friedmans to China. One main street in Shanghai was fully lit at night, and we all applauded when our bus passed a shop owned by traveling companion Jimmy Lai. The Friedmans stopped briefly in Shanghai in 1998, and Milton could hardly believe what he saw. Two episodes of the Friedmans' China visits should go on record. First, I taught Milton a lesson in Chinese economics. In Shanghai, 1988, walking in the street and hungry, I saw a dumplings vendor and pulled out my wallet, but found out money was not good enough: food coupons were also required. A passer-by saw that I was arguing with the dumpling man and happened. The reason is that the xian system worked better in the Yangtze River basin, because down south private enterprises were already established under earlier contractual arrangements. Factories were scattered hither-thither, untidy and dirty, but business interests were significantly vested. In other words, in the south there was a lack of the flexibility in land use necessary for xians to compete effectively. Not that the southern xians do not compete, but they did not possess the flexibility to juggle land use which their northern counterparts enjoyed. This experience also taught us that the belief that dispensing with government planning and relying on the market is always more efficient is wrong. World-class industrial villages cropped up in the Yangtze River basin, with beautiful landscaping and all the modern facilities, and they were routinely planned by xian officials. They plan, however, for the market! The officials know that good things sell better. They also know that they are likely to be sacked if what they plan does not sell.
There is a formula for distributing income between xians and the higher authorities that is important in promoting competition. Very briefly, at the early stage fixed amounts were paid to the higher authorities. This often led to conflict, as some localities felt that they were being exploited just because they did well. Sharing arrangements were then introduced, with quarrels occurring again because the rates were not the same among localities.
This brings us to an important development in 1994. From then until now, investors in a locality or xian are subject to a 17% value-added tax which is uniform throughout the country. The xian is entitled to one-quarter of this, or 4.25% of the value-added in production. Alternatively, a small private enterprise may pay 4-6% business tax (depending on the nature of business). Profit tax is on top, but this does not concern us here. For the purposes of our discussion we may also ignore the business tax, which one has to pay even when losing money. The value-added tax yields by far the highest revenue, and it is this tax that xian officials are most concerned about. Let us therefore concentrate on the 17% tax on that part of output value over and above the cost of raw materials and other deductibles.
gave me a small stack of food coupons. I was delighted, and Milton asked why I was so happy. I said, "The gentleman gave me these coupons free of charge. Can you imagine food coupons worth nothing? This city is going to explode!" It did. A second episode is that Milton lost a debate! In Chengdu, 1993, the governor of Sichuan province received us. Milton tried to teach the governor about the proper way to reform, saying that to cut the tail off a mouse, don't do it inch by inch: To reduce pain the whole tail should be cut off all at once. The governor responded: "My dear professor, our mouse has so many tails we do not know which one to [be] cut first." Milton could not respond. Sadly, that governor is no longer with us. A courageous man noted for his bold criticisms, it is said that he lost support from Beijing at the end.
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The question is whether this take of 17% is a tax, or a rent? My view is that it is rent and not tax, for two reasons. First, whenever an investor uses land or real property to generate income then he is required to pay the tax. Second, this tax would have to be paid as long as income is generated, regardless of profit or loss by the accounting measure.
In 1986, I observed:
In ancient China, as in medieval Europe, no distinction existed between the meanings of "rent" and "tax." A feudal lord who collected rent became a collector of tax when he assumed the role of a "government" in providing services such as justice and protection. (Cheung 1986) It may seem trivial to quibble over what is tax and what is rent, except in the paradigm of economics tax maximization is routinely criticized, while rent maximization is often endorsed. The truth of the matter is that for the efficient use of land rent would have to be charged, no matter by the landlord or by the government. How the proceeds are spent is a separate matter. It is my contention that since the xians are competing, the maximization of rent is consistent with efficiency provided all land is used. This does not mean there is nothing left over for the investors. Their expected income net of the rental tax must be sufficient to cover interest cost, and if the economy grows because of their investment, their income may well exceed what had been anticipated. In fact, most investors have been doing very well under the xian system, particularly since 2000. In other words, with the economy growing and land rents rising, there are implied increases in income which fall into the hands of investors, workers, and peasants. Judging from the shifts in the relative prices in favor of agricultural products since 2003, these implied increases are very substantial indeed. The uniform 17% level selected for the value-added tax was reached after many rounds of negotiation with the different localities. It is clearly share rent and hence a clear case of sharecropping between the xians and investors on the one hand and between the xians and the upper levels on the other hand. There was an analytical conundrum which took me months to resolve. I wrote The Theory of Share Tenancy 40 years ago, and one of the main points of departure from tradition was that I allowed the sharing percentage to vary to obtain efficiency results. It was clear from the evidence in Asian agriculture that sharing percentages varied significantly according to land grades and localities. But now the value-added tax, a share rent, is the same throughout the country. How can that lead to efficiency? If not, why would China have accelerated so much in growth under the sharing arrangement?
One night I recalled a footnote of Marshall which I read as a graduate student, and jumped out of bed to find it. Marshall argued that share rent is less efficient than fixed rent, but he added a footnote:
If the [share rent] landlord controls the amount [of capital] freely and in his own interest, and can bargain with his tenant as to the amount of labor he applies, it can be proved geometrically that he will so adjust it as to force the tenant to cultivate the land just as intensively as he would under the English tenure [fixed rent], and his share will then be the same as under it. (Marshall 1956: 536, note 2) To this I responded in my sharecropping work:
Marshall provided no geometric proof, and it is an interesting conjecture whether he would have altered this footnote had he done so. This conjecture is interesting because the results he conceived are correct only in certain special cases, but as a matter of generality they are incorrect. They are incorrect because Marshall did not allow the rental percentage to vary. (Cheung 1969a: 45) Based on Marshall's footnote and my comment, and assuming the xian as the landlord, I asked myself what amount of "capital" can the xian provide to guarantee an efficient solution when the sharing percentage is held fixed and uniform. The answer, which I discovered around the end of 2004, is that the land price charged by the xians (to investors as sharecroppers) can actually be negative! Taking land to be the capital contributed by the landlord, the possibility of using a negative land price means the landlord is offering infinite opportunities for adjustment, under which the equi-marginal condition required for efficiency can always be attained as long as the uniform sharing is within a reasonable range.
By a negative land price, I mean that when an investor comes to a xian to consider investment and production, the xian may not only give improved land to the investor free of charge, they may even build the facilities gratis, or allow the investor a rebate over a number of years out of the value-added tax the xian is entitled to. Of course, not all xians are worth investing in, as there is no point building a factory in the hilly wilderness. Social returns aside, the guideline of how negative a land price can be offered is a return high enough to cover the interest forgone in the xian's efforts to obtain and improve land for industrial or commercial usage. We will return to this question in the next section.
Beijing's prohibition on land prices going negative, imposed in 2006 for some xians, suggests that they did not understand the working of the implicit sharecropping system. But it may not be so. There is the problem that China's population would be concentrated in the popular regions, to the detriment of a more even distribution which is more desirable in the long run. I wrote about the The Economic System of China issue, but could offer no solution. There are matters for which market prices are not available to guide decisions, as Coase and I have expounded in our work on the firm, and errors can only be discovered ex-post.
The sharing formula and its effects
One evening in 2005, the head of a xian from far away called, saying he happened to be in the neighborhood and wanted to drop in for a visit. He came, took off his shoes, laid on the sofa, closed his eyes for some minutes, and then asked, "Professor, may I have a glass of wine?" Of course he may.
I knew what must have happened. Xian officials like this friend run all over the country soliciting investment. Whenever a business-inviting conference is held in a certain city, the word would get around and officials from countless xians would arrive. It is not uncommon these days that xian officials dine at business occasions several times in one evening.
A xian with a mere 300,000 in population would often employ 500 investment solicitors. In 2005 a xian in Anhui province held a beauty contest, selecting the most beautiful, charming, and persuasive ladies to head the teams. Criticized all over the country, the head of that xian fought back: "Beauty is an asset, why not use it?" Want a business license? The xian will assign someone to do the walking and talking for you. Want a building permit? They will give you one with a money-back guarantee. Unhappy about that dirty creek passing through the site? They may offer to build a small lake for you. They will help you find architects, find builders, and coming to the production phase, they will help you recruit workers for a reasonable fee. Yes, xians have worker-recruiting teams, which do the hiring for clients. They sell their cheap electricity, sell their parks and entertainment, sell their easy transportation, sell their water supply, sell their glorious history, and sell even how good-looking their girls are -no exaggeration! Competition among localities of a level comparable to that among xians in China is unheard of. Why is this so? One contributing factor is the sharing formula. Let us explain this formula before turning to other factors in the next section.
As we have seen, investors coming to a xian would have to pay 17% in value-added tax. Of this the xian is entitled to a cut of 25%, or 4.25% of valueadded. From the proceeds from land sales (if positive) 75% goes to the xian and 25% to higher levels. This latter percentage is not uniform for all xians: the better a xian is located the lower will be its share of income from land sales. Of the xian officials I talked to, none of them cared how the higher levels divide their take.
Land costs are substantial. These consist of two parts. First peasants must be paid to give up their land. Using a 5% rate of interest, I estimated in 2006 that such payments come to about 3-5 times the discounted market rental of the land when used for farming. Quarrels between xian officials and peasants occasionally occurred, but far less frequently than reported in the press. It is true that some officials take secret cuts in between and that a xian short of funds may owe the peasants for a long period of time.
The costs of developing or improving agricultural land for industrial or business use are even more substantial. In 2006, these costs were in the neighborhood of RMB 60,000 per mu (660 square meters), about twice the compensation to peasants. Improvements include building roads, putting in power, water, gas, and sewers, cables for telephones, television, and computers, street lighting, and landscaping. These improvements are made before the land is sold. Today, even in lower level areas, the quality of new industrial real estate offered by the xians is higher than what I was familiar with in the State of Washington. At the top level, like those in the Suzhou industrial village, it is the best I have ever seen. Chinese peasants are superb in planting things -they often transplant trees over 50 years old -and you cannot beat what Arthur Lewis would say is an "unlimited supply" of them working for landscaping at US $5.00 each for one long day.
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I did some rough calculations in 2006, using data from a xian of moderately above-average performance, to arrive the following results. Assuming that an industrial site is built to a plot ratio of 0.8 and a factory of typical labor intensity, the xian's 4.25% cut of the value-added would come to 12% of the total cost of acquiring the agricultural land and improving it to a good industrial site. This did not include administrative costs, but the figures suggest that the xian could indeed afford to give away the site freely and subsidize the investor a little.
There is no question that within a xian and in the sale of virtually identical industrial sites at the same time, the land price may vary greatly. Except for occasional favoritism that leads to scandals, price discrimination is not implied. 
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Xian officials are selective of the type of investors they want. What they are going after is not only the value-added tax but also the image and reputation an investor would bring, compatibility with existing economic activity, and so on. It is not unusual that when an investor's project is believed to be a big draw for the locality, the negative land price would go so far down that the xian's cut in the value-added tax would not cover interest on the cost of land.
Xian officials may sometimes be corrupt, but over the years I have never met a stupid one. They know that equalizing marginal social returns from similar sites is the way to maximize income for the xian and for themselves, and if the prices of similar sites are equal there is no way they can achieve that. They also know that it is very difficult to make accurate judgments in investment, and therefore they send researchers all over the country visiting successful xians. In numerous discussions with xian officials I have been impressed by their general knowledge of things, and know they are forever concerned with matters such as complementarity, drawing power, transportation, electricity, water, and entertainment. I am not saying that xian officials are never corrupt, but the truth is that I have never met an investor who did not believe in exploiting special connections. Yes, xian officials are world-class in convincing each and every investor that he or she is special! Let me repeat that while the rate of value-added tax and the division of that tax is uniform throughout the country, the other percentages are not. In particular, the sharing of the proceeds from land sales is not uniform, and less popular xians would receive higher shares to partially cover land costs. Additional mention must be made of award figures in the formula. Based strictly on investment money deposited in local banks, in one xian I know that officials receive 1.5-2% that amount, if the investment is from outside the country. For investors from inside China, the award is 1%. These are essentially commissions paid by the xian. For the xian in question the award rate in earlier years was 5%, which gradually fell as the xian grew. In one hot spot, the award rate is 0.05%. The rate is negotiable, in the way that commissions on property transactions in China are negotiable. Most xian officials I talked to felt that award rates were adequate to keep them running.
Economic interpretation of the xian phenomenon
The intensity of competition among xians is remarkable. It is submitted to be the chief reason why China was able to sustain rapid growth during some very difficult times in the 1990s. Vietnam copied China's system nearly verbatim beginning from around 2004 -some say tipped off by my writings -and their economy, too, has taken off. It is not difficult to copy this system, provided that a country is not burdened with vested interests at local levels and that it possesses an organization like the Chinese Communist Party to force things through. My view is that countries like North Korea and Cuba would have a good chance of success if they want to try. Not difficult to copy, but very difficult to explain. It is difficult to explain why the system works so well. It took me only one evening to crack open the riddle of sharecropping, but three long years to decipher the China code. The difficulty stems from the fact that what we have here is a complex system of contracts, the like of which has never been seen. Its evolution has been rapid, and in the process different localities adopted different arrangements before things finally settled into a comprehensible pattern. It takes time to see the essential links and elements, and by the time I thought I have distilled the beer from the froth some key pieces were still missing. I have learned a great deal following the economic reforms in China. My understanding of contracts and transaction/institution costs had been elevated to a level which enabled me to locate the missing pieces with a general theory and then put the pieces together to form a picture that makes sense.
Perhaps I should begin by relating an episode in the spring of 1969, when Coase and I were in a conference on fisheries in Vancouver. Someone remarked that if ocean fishery is privatized, because the fish swim for long distances the granting of monopoly is essential, therefore monopoly pricing in fishery would prevail. I instantly responded: "If I alone own all the agricultural land on earth, I would have to rent them out to numerous peasants to farm; the peasants will compete, and therefore agricultural products must have competitive prices." Now Beijing is the largest landlord in the world, holding the title to all land under the Chinese sky. The authorities let the land out for a variety of use with 50 year leases, and in 2007 it was declared that all leases would be automatically renewed upon expiry, subject to the proviso that the government may see fit to take back land subject to compensation. The authorities have accepted the principle that all use rights must be delineated as exclusive. They also knew that to do so comprehensively, they have to allow the delineated use rights to go all the way down to each and every household. To maintain control of an orderly downward transmission of economic forces and knowing that responsibility contracts worked, the layer-by-layer responsibility arrangements emerged. For an outsider studying the rules and regulations from documents of the different layers, there is little chance he could figure out that a chain of responsibility contracts is implied. These documents are actually revised and evolved versions of the earlier responsibility contracts.
Different layers are vertically chained, but horizontally there is no linkage. This is one reason why units within the same layer compete against one another, and because economic power rests mainly in the xians, at that layer competition is the most intense. Adding fuel to the fire, the delineation of rights applies everywhere. The geographic boundaries defining a xian are clear, and the rights and responsibilities of xian officials are assigned in such a way and with such clarity that there is no question that xians are effectively business firms of the first order. Business firms of the same nature compete, and this is another reason for the intense competition among xians.
Still adding more fuel to the fire, xian officials are rewarded according to performance. No doubt politicking and corruption are present, but these activities, too, can be expected in large corporations in advanced market economies. Other than the formula of awards described earlier, xian officials are entitled to business expenses rather generously, depending on how much money the xian makes. Each individual is allowed to buy one living quarter at construction cost and is subject to promotion based on performance. There is a "56-year-old hypothesis" in circulation: With salaries so low and awards inadequate in some xians, and with the retirement age being 60, by the age of 56 officials not having enough savings are inclined to be corrupt. Some officials, however, told me that competent individuals are on demand from outside businesses, because managing a xian is in fact managing a business.
The adoption of value-added taxation in 1994 was another addition of fuel to the fire. In essence, it is sharecropping. As noted in my early work, under sharecropping the landlord cares a lot more about the performance of tenants than when there is a fixed rent, because his income depends on tenant performance (Cheung 1969a: 72-79) . A vivid example to illustrate the intensity of competition among the xians is that of shopping malls. A xian may be viewed as a large shopping center, under the umbrella of one corporation. Tenants renting shop spaces in the center are the equivalent of investors in a xian. The tenant pays a fixed minimum rent (the equivalent of an investor paying a fixed land price), a share rent on top (the equivalent of value-added tax), and we all know the shopping center owner is careful in selecting tenants and tries to accommodate tenants in many ways because of share contracting. And, like shopping centers offering special deals to anchor stores, xians offer special deals to investors who they consider to be big draws. If a whole country is filled with such shopping centers, doing similar business but with the entities being separate, the intensity of competition among them would be very strong indeed.
The xian system does more to encourage competition than the hypothetical shopping centers. Xians are held responsible to the layers above. Thus these upper layers not only encourage competition -they enforce it! After all, the upper layers are entitled to a 75% cut of value-added tax. It is here the layer-bylayer responsibility arrangement intensifies competition among xians.
Let us return to the nature of the responsibility system to comprehend better the intense competition among xians. During the evolution of that system, the delineation of use rights, and hence private property rights, is woven into market contracts. As the Coase Theorem implies, the use of the market is in two steps. The first is the delineation of private property rights, which in my view is itself a contract restraining competition for scarce resources. The second step comes with the market proper, where the rights to use resources or to the outputs produced are exchanged under the form of price-bearing contracts.
The responsibility system rests on a different arrangement. It combines the delineation of private use rights and market transactions into one contract. An investor in a xian often signs a contract only several pages long, stating land size, location, and price, what he can do and what he must do, and by what time various duties must be discharged on both sides. The deed to the land, however, will not be issued until some months after money from the investor is lodged in a local bank. This signed market contract is transferable, but for future sale of the land or for mortgage purposes, the land deed issued later helps a great deal.
The question in my view is why the weaving of property rights into a market contract is so significant in encouraging competition, as compared to the twostage process envisaged under the Coase Theorem. The answer is that with the weaving-in arrangement the investor is obliged to perform. Other than paying money, the investor has to discharge the contractual stipulations to secure the right to use the land. In other words, price aside, responsibility contracts are meant to be awarded to deserving winners. Errors in judgment of course occur, and investors playing tricks are not unusual, as some may just build a fence around the property and do nothing more. When land prices are falling xian officials may look sideways, but when the economy picks up they will move to reclaim the property per contractual stipulations. There was plenty of screaming from investors around 2000, when sharply fallen land prices began to turn around. However, investors who performed as stipulated were all smiling.
The weaving-in arrangement as described is not unique to China. As Coase rightly points out, lease and employment contracts in many countries often exhibit similar features, and I have pointed to the similarity to contractual arrangements found in shopping centers. I have also noted that none of the parts in the xian system is new. What is new and important is the way the parts are put together through the manifestation of the responsibility contracts: Namely, use rights are granted in exchange for performance, and that this basic principle applies everywhere. In particular, in the industrial sector the contractual arrangements between the state and private entities, via weaving-in and with sharecropping and the layer-by-layer chaining, is an awesome display of economic forces at work, at a time when more than one billion people were poor but the leaders were courageous enough and intelligent enough to follow the principle of "give it a try and then take a look."
The rights structure implied by chained responsibility contracts is reminiscent of the constitution of a country, except that arrangements in China are more flexible in that the terms are negotiable, and in general they are far more market oriented than under any constitution I know. In February 2004, I published a long article "It is Not Yet Time to Revise the Constitution," trying to halt the constitutional revision in progress at that time. 29 My point is that the economic system of China is so important that Beijing should study the nature of the system, pinpoint the key elements, and introduce them into the constitution. Beijing did not heed this advice, and the subsequent revised constitution has little bearing on the economic system's rights structure. Apparently Beijing did not fully appreciate that they have done something right, beautiful, and brilliant. Four implications of significance are obtained from our study of the Chinese economic experience. First, to the importance of the market and private property in advancing life and livelihood, we must add the question of how contracts are arranged and structured to form an economic system. We have shown that the economic system of China involves a far-reaching but delicate structure of contracts the like of which has not been seen, and the competition among xians which this contractual arrangement promotes is, in my view, the key to answering the "China question". Of course, as scientists we cannot rule out the possibility that there may be other contractual arrangements that would work better, but are as yet untried. As things stand at the turn of the century, and given the country's relatively poor natural resource endowment, I submit that the economic system of China is the most effective engine of growth in the history of mankind.
Second, how individuals and institutions are constrained matters in the choice of contractual structure that defines the economic system. The xianbased system works very well for China, a country with a huge population and exiguous natural resources but blessed with an intelligent people capable of working long and hard. For a country more richly endowed, adopting China's economic system may well bear less fruit.
Third, the speed of economic growth depends a great deal on the contractual structure which defines the economic system. We have seen that xian officials give priority to investors who promise to perform faster, and they themselves routinely add a hefty shove to the push. The sharing formula dictates that what the officials earn is directly and positively related to the rate of growth. Therefore, it has been a mistake on the part of Beijing that when they saw the economy growing at more than 8 or 9% a year, far higher than in the outside world, anxious thoughts emerged regarding "over-heating" and polices were introduced to cool things down. My close observation of China for 30 years suggests that economic fluctuations there are attributable to changes in policy, while not one trace of business cycles of the endogenous type described in the western world has been observed.
Finally, I do not believe the evolution of China's economic system could have progressed to a situation of near-miracle without the government or the Communist Party playing a significant role. As I unhappily indicated in the "Epilogue," this golden age seems to have lasted only 29 years. Make it or break it, the government was, and is, important in China's economic system. It is a sad omen for economics that most, if not all, of the stupid policies recently adopted in China were conceived in the abstract by returning Ph.D.s in the subject.
Side effects of xian competition
One has to be careful while reading Chinese newspaper reports on economic policies these days. The articles are not lying, but they tend to mislead because the writers generally do not understand the economic system. Since xians are given substantial autonomous decision-making powers on economic matters, sometimes what is announced by Beijing as an intended policy is not followed. Minimum wages have been introduced at different dates and vary greatly among xians, and some xians merely announce that there is one but choose not to enforce it. When Beijing announced that 70% of apartments must be built to no more than 90 square meters, some localities announced one or two such projects when selling land, while others acted as if nothing has happened. Newspaper headlines say that one outsider cannot buy more than one living quarters: Shenzhen currently enforces this policy, but Shanghai says they have not heard of it.
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30 By November 2007 this rule applied to Shanghai also, but different parts of that very large city have different ways to get around it. The rule has therefore never been enforced in Shanghai. In Shenzhen the rule was enforced for a while, then an outsider who wanted additional living quarters could buy a way for about US$4,000, and then the property market fell and the government looked sideways.
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This does not mean that Beijing is not in control. They are in control, but local officials know what type of announcement is for real and what type is meant to test the waters. Local officials have their way of evaluating the seriousness of the documents handed down to them. Requests from Beijing for local opinions regarding policies are routine, and adopted policies may be quietly dropped without announcement. Some villages have democratic voting, some do not, and those who do introduced voting at greatly different times.
I surmise that this seemingly chaotic picture is not really chaos, but it is the result of a combination of the autonomous powers given to localities and varying decisions on the part of the localities to adopt policies. In particular, a decision to adopt policies for window dressing is subject to considerations as to whether the xian would gain in competition. A xian would have to attract more investors to increase value-added tax -indeed to survive -and the officials know the adoption of bad policies will drive them away. If Beijing really meant to enforce a policy, the xians will accept, but if the policy is contrary to locality interests, they will complain. The complaints are often effective if the number is large enough.
It is difficult to demolish the rights structure of the xian system, and this is a good reason to support the optimistic view that the rapid growth can be sustained for many years to come. The problem lies in matters in which the localities have no say: The monetary system, exchange controls, foreign policy, freedom of speech and religion, state-monitored education and healthcare, communications, and the activities of large state monopolies.
I am concerned that Beijing does not seem to have an adequate comprehension of the workings of the economic system, for there are indications that they are trying to tamper with it. 31 My view is that with some gentle fine-tuning, the system will be solid and firm. As I remarked in my long article of February 2004, in idealized form the layer-by-layer chaining of responsibility contracts with sharing arrangements possesses the merit that, if the delineated rights of one member in the chain are infringed upon, all members in that chain must in some degree share the cost of that infringement. Because of locality or xian competition, joint-venture contracts with foreigners were developed into a special form of patent licensing, with royalty payments remittable to foreign banks free of exchange controls. I have investigated 31 On 1 January 2007, Beijing imposed two items on the xians. First, compensations paid to peasants to obtain land were substantially increased. This is a judgment call. Second, all land sales for construction purposes must go through auction. In principle this latter would run counter to the workings of the xian system, but there is a way out. A xian would make a land auction project specific, and with obscure advertising and short lead time, a successfully negotiated investor is usually the auction winner. patent licenses for some years and fully understand the difficulty of their enforcement, but taking the form of a joint-venture contract with a foreign director on site to monitor performance, enforcement costs would be sharply reduced. This is one reason why foreign investors flock to China today. Zhou Yan miraculously got hold of a number of samples of these joint-venture contracts and earned a doctorate in a good dissertation analyzing them. I have arranged to have her deliver a precis in this conference, so I will say no more.
Because of xian competition, concentration of industries by type in particular locations is very pronounced. Chinese products are flooding the world market, but little is known in the outside world of the degree of locality concentration and specialization of industrial production. The ceramics industry of Foshan is a classic example, and I have arranged Li Junhui to write a paper on the subject for this conference, as she is teaching at the University of Foshan.
Because of xian competition, privatization of state enterprises has been pressed to proceed faster. Around the turn of the century, a rise in land prices greatly assisted privatization. With higher land prices, local governments could afford to pay off state employees and remove the major obstacle to private purchase. Buyers of the state enterprises would sell properties located in prime areas and move the factories to where land is cheaper. The City of Changsha may have broken the world record in the speed of state enterprise privatization. I have arranged for their vice mayor, Liu Xiaoming, who was in charge, to deliver a paper detailing what happened.
Xian competition has also been a force to reduce corruption. Other things equal, only uninformed investors will put money in a xian noted for corruption. Experienced investors know bribing is a cost, and in earlier days factory owners down south routinely penciled in such costs when quoting prices to buyers. Not all corruption is gone, but at the xian level it is very much reduced, particularly when compared to the early 1990s. Officials I talked to concur that competition among xians have helped to bring this about.
Finally, it is my view that the great flexibility of contracting observed all over China these past 10 or 15 years -other than the chain of responsibility contracts as discussed above -is also the result of competition among xians. It was this flexible choice of contracts that helped to save China from recession in the second half of the 1990s.
One question remains: There will come a time when the conversion of land use from agriculture to industry and commerce would hit very strong diminishing returns -perhaps 10 years from now. Will the intense competition among xians observed today vanish? My answer is that some weakening of competition will occur. However, given the nature of the xian system, fresh directions would doubtlessly be found in which to compete. The most likely and profitable candidate is competition in terms of technology. For this reason I have advised my Beijing friends to hold firm to the value-added tax, because technological progress is the most effective way to increase value-added.
10 The monetary system of China and the rise of the RMB Zhu Rongji is a brilliant man. Though seated in several different offices, the general consensus is that he was the man in charge of the Chinese economy from July 1993 to March 2003. Zhu had every appearance of a planner, a dictator, a market skeptic, and I criticized him for his handling of inflation in 1995. Later, I openly apologized in writing and on television: He was right; I was wrong. We cannot evaluate a reformer based on what he says or even on what he does. The performance can only be evaluated on the basis of results. By this measure, Zhu deserves full marks. Appearing to want power, yet during his tenure central economic power was significantly reduced. Critical of the market, yet during his tenure domestic markets became so free that they were inspiring even to dyed-in-the-wool neoclassical economists. You may accuse the market of selling fakes, but the sharp improvements in product quality rival those of Japan during a similar stage of development, and market contracts, both for goods and services and for workers, exhibit a range of choice seldom seen elsewhere.
In 1993, inflation in China was accelerating and the RMB was diving. I published an article on 21 May saying that there was no point to control the money supply, because it cannot be done. 32 The problem was that banks in China were payroll offices, and that people in power could "borrow" on demand. I therefore proposed that the People's Bank should assume the duties of a central bank and not engage in business transactions. Even more importantly, I argued that the power demand for money must go. Zhu Rongji took charge of the People's Bank on 1 July 1993 and stayed in that post for only two years, but he created the basic framework of China's monetary system and monitored its performance until retiring from the premiership in March 2003. In 1995, he converted the People's Bank into a central bank of the classic type. What he did to curb inflation was direct restrictions on borrowing and spending, with the RMB anchored to the US dollar. I was doubtful of the merits of such restrictions, but then this may have been the only way to cut off the power demand for money. Influenced by Friedman, I objected to the pegged rate.
When Hong Kong's Financial Secretary decided to adopt the currency board system and peg the Hong Kong dollar to the US dollar in 1983, I was involved in the discussions. Charles Goodhart argued that the Hong Kong dollar must be anchored, and Friedman supported the currency board. What about the RMB? In the late 1980s it was showing signs of difficulties, and by early 1990s its exchange value began to collapse. I consulted Milton on a number of occasions, and he was extremely generous with his time whenever issues involving China cropped up.
Milton's view was that a country the size of China could not use the currency board. He said that my suggestion of anchoring the RMB to a basket of commodities would work in principle, but the cost would be high. His choice was that China go to fiat money, control the money supply tightly, and let the exchange rate float.
In July 1997, soon after the Asian financial crisis struck, a group of economists from Beijing asked to meet me in Shenzhen. They were deeply concerned about what would happen. During the discussion I suddenly turned bullish, because I began to realize that Zhu was right. In three short years he brought inflation from over 20% to zero, and given sharply rising product quality at that time deflation must be implied. I inferred then that the Asian financial crisis was a consequence of the sudden and sharp strengthening of the RMB. In one way or another most countries in Asia, including China, tied their currencies to the US dollar at that time, so when inflation came to a halt in China, under international competition the small boats tied to the dollar broke loose because their currencies became overvalued.
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About a year later, I began to appreciate the Zhu system even more. His method may be interpreted as anchoring the RMB to a tradable index, using the dollar as a proxy, and the issuance of the RMB was guided by the inflows of foreign direct investment. He guarded that index with care. Inspired by Zhu, I came to the view that a currency may anchor itself to a tradable index of a basket of commodities, without having the real commodities in store, provided that the monetary authority possesses foreign reserves for occasional intervention and 33 I did not publish this explanation at the time in fear it might trigger further disturbance in the currency market. When I finally did so on 27 April 2006 in a Chinese article entitled "The Story of the Iron Prime Minister," a Beijing friend who was expert on the crisis was stunned and told me that my explanation must be right. He and his colleagues were fanatically seeking an explanation for the crisis at that time, but in retrospect whatever they came up has proved false.
见张五常, 《铁总理的故事》 , 二○○六年四月二十七日发表于《壹周刊》。
The Economic System of China more importantly that monetary policy is not used to correct problems in the real economy. If money is kept to monetary phenomena, then anchoring the exchange value to a tradable index would not be difficult to attain and sustain.
It was the flexibility of market contracts that helped to save China from recession in the latter part of the 1990s. Deflation exceeded 3% even ignoring sharp improvements in product quality, and property prices dropped two-thirds or more. However, unemployment stayed around 4% and the growth rate around 8%. Bonus contracts and piece-rate contracts, overwhelmingly used in industries, provided automatic downward adjustments in real wages. 34 Furthermore, to protect his 8% goal, Zhu freed the market completely, pushed hard for the privatization of state enterprises, lifted restrictions to allow workers to freely "float" around the country, and speeded up the dissemination of economic decisions. Zhu might have started out as a market skeptic, but he must have turned believer before stepping down.
To return to money matters in China, in a lecture delivered at Tianjin's Nankai University in 2002, I argued that the RMB was the strongest currency in the world -at that time the black market rate was still below the official rate.
35 Then in March 2003, in an article commenting on Zhu's retirement, I said the RMB was so strong that within two years western countries will pressure China to appreciate -the black market rate was about on par with the official rate then. 36 These assessments of currency strength in terms of interactions between official and black rates were based on discussions with Milton in 1993 and my understanding of underground currency dealings over the years. Beijing, of course, was fully aware of these activities. Outside pressures to appreciate the RMB did come, not two years later, but in about four months. I have stood firm against any significant appreciation of the RMB. The reason is that to improve the livelihood of the peasants, they must be encouraged to move to the industrial sector. In no way could China's economic reform be regarded to be successful, unless the peasant's standard of living is lifted to a level on par with city workers. For centuries, the tale of Chinese peasants has been blood, toil, tears, and sweat. For the first time in memory the peasant is seeing a glimmer of light, but a substantially appreciating RMB will extinguish that hope.
34 Bonus contracts provide automatic downward adjustment in wages. Piece rates are equally flexible because they are often renegotiated when new orders from buyers arrive. 见张五常, 《制度的选择》 , 第四章, 第六节, 二○○二年花千树出版。 35 张五常, 《以中国青年为本位的金融制度》 , 二○○二年六月二十日发表于《壹周刊》。 36 张五常, 《令人羡慕的困境--朱镕基退休有感》 , 二○○三年三月十一日发表于《苹果 日报》。 I told Milton in Stockholm in 1991, on the occasion of Coase's Nobel Prize, that the world would soon see an introduction of one to two billion cheap workers into international trade, and the structure of the global economy would be very different in 20 years. That competition has arrived, and my concern for China is that wage rates in the country, though low, are now substantially higher than places like India and Vietnam. I am delighted to see these countries, too, are developing strongly, for the simple reason that the richer they are, the more money China will make trading with them. However, appreciating the RMB in effect amounts to offering a handicap. How could Chinese peasants gain a higher standard of living with a sharply rising RMB, when even today many of them have not seen a real plane flying?
There are numerous factories in China which I have called order-takers. They hold no patent rights and no brand names, but only execute orders to produce to given samples or designs. Whenever a purchaser wants a certain product, he would send out requests for samples and pricing, sometimes to several countries. My view, supported by hard fact, is that Chinese peasants trying industrial work generally begin in order-taking factories, and then move up the ladder with acquired skills and knowledge. I am grateful to Bob Mundell who, too, has spoken out loud on many occasions against significant appreciation of the RMB.
It would be easy to relieve the market pressure to appreciate the RMB. Instead of foolishly suppressing demand for money -which the authorities are doing at the time of writing -they should drop exchange controls and let the RMB out to freely trade in the international market. Downward and upward pressures on a currency are not symmetrical. A currency facing downward pressure is a headache, but one facing upward pressure is not badly off. Letting the RMB out as proposed above makes money for the country, and since China is already flooded with foreign reserves it would be easy to buy the RMB back if need be. Any concern about inflation can be removed by anchoring the RMB to a basket of commodities.
Inspired by Zhu's monetary system, I suggested in 2003 and repeated it several times, that the RMB should be anchored to a basket of commodities, or rather to the price index of such a basket. No commodities need be held in storage by the monetary authorities. The authorities simply guarantee the RMB holder that a given amount would purchase the specified basket in specified markets.
This tradable index is easily adjustable, which means the domestic price level would be easily adjustable. The selection of commodities and the assignment of weights require careful consideration, but if done properly inflation will no longer be a matter of concern. The idea of anchoring a currency to a basket of commodities was discussed with Milton years ago, and it is consistent with the views of Mundell. Zhu's experience suggests the costs would be low in practice, because a currency may successfully anchor itself to a tradable commodity price index and no actual commodities need be held by the monetary authorities.
Beijing considered my proposed monetary system carefully, which in reality is the Zhu system modified. The modification involves taking one step sideway to avoid confrontation with other nations, by saying: "Here we are back to the old commodity standard, except that we go by a tradable index and hold no commodities in reserve. This is how we value our currency, and against all other currencies exchange rates are freely floating." Of course, to guard against inflation it would be far better to anchor a currency to a tradable index of real things than to paper currencies.
I am not disturbed that the central bank has not accepted my suggestions, but what they have done over the past two or three years are matters of genuine concern. Other than what have been mentioned, my impression is that they want to go to fiat money. In this case, monetary policy sooner or later would have to enter. This will sharply increase the power of the monetary authorities to intervene in economic activity, which would in due course increase the risk of undermining the xian system.
Let me repeat an important point made earlier. The rights structure of competing xians cannot be easily demolished. Any unwarranted policy which infringes on the xians' interests and in which they have a say, I do not worry about. For example, I do not worry about domestic price controls or rent controls, and if they are introduced I put my money on that they would not be enforced, or if enforced the controls would be lifted before long. But I do worry about are policies in which the xians have no say. In this regard, monetary matters are at the top of my trouble list.
Concluding remarks
I have concentrated on what China has done right to produce an economic miracle, thinking I would introduce a few negative remarks to balance things out at the end. But I find myself reluctant to do so. This is the 30th anniversary of the beginning of economic reform, and Chinese tradition teaches that we do not throw mud on someone's face on his or her birthday. And it is not just someone. It is a civilization once so rich and so deep that some of the fine pottery and jade carvings produced 5,000 years ago cannot be replicated even today. This heritage I am proud of, and those who study Chinese history and culture will concur that it is a source of pride for mankind. A renaissance of the Chinese heritage is occurring right now.
Beijing has a great deal to be proud of. Criticize the authorities in detail if you want, but they have done so much to relieve poverty, on such a massive scale and with such speed, that there cannot be any parallel in history. I surmise that such an accomplishment would never be repeated -anywhere, anytime.
I have stood firm on the merits of private property and the market for more than 40 years. However, I have never objected to the existence of the Communist Party of China. From day one I opposed reform through the democratic voting process. In no uncertain terms I told a group of old comrades during our first encounter in Beijing in 1983: "You messed the country up; you fix it for me." We became good friends. Sadly, many of them are no longer around. They have delivered far more than I anticipated. In the middle of the night I sometimes wonder how some of them would react if they could live long enough to see the China of today.
The Communist Party of China has done a marvelous job! Political parties have problems, all kinds of problems. How is it possible to properly organize party activities and enforce party rules when the membership is 80 millions strong? It is mind-boggling.
The Party led the way and directed the action. But the main reason for success is the Chinese people, hardy, intelligent, and resilient, who can take a huge amount of suffering today when they see opportunities opening up tomorrow. I am not going on to praise the Chinese people, but I have never seen individuals working so hard for so little under such miserable conditions -and still smile. In 2004, while taking photos in the wilderness, my wife had a conversation with a woman working in the field. The woman said she had a pay day every so often, when someone called and bused her to the industrial district to do landscaping. Leaving home before dawn and returning in darkness, surviving on a loaf of bread and a bottle of water, she earned US$7 a day. I saw her smiling and asked why she was so happy. She said livelihood had improved because her expertise of planting trees was for the first time in her life in demand from outsiders, and that her daughter had just graduated from college with a good job at US$200 a month. It is individuals like that woman, millions and millions of them, who have built up the China of today.
I published my first Chinese article in 1979, but writing in earnest did not begin until the fall of 1983. Chinese officials and business executives in their prime today were college students then. Many of them read my writings, and as an old man now I get free meals everywhere I go. It has been a pleasure wining and dining with them and at the same time obtaining first-hand information to support the writing of this paper. I here thank them all, with deep sincerity, and thank them again for the roles they have played in pushing their country to see the dawn of light. Popular reports that say Chinese officials are routinely corrupt are simply not true. Many are highly intelligent and dedicated. An ethos of competition exists among officials and businessmen which reminds me of my student days at UCLA in the early 1960s. Within each group they know or have heard of who is who, assess each others' ability, and play the competitive game of performance ranking. It is as if they have no purpose in mind except to see who could climb higher.
The xian official who came to visit and asked for a glass of wine is one example. He worked so hard for so small a salary -about US$300 a monththat I wondered what drove the man. Would it be corruption money? Promotion? Prestige? Very subtly I tried to feel him out. After a while he knew what I was going after, and said: "My dear professor, I just want to do something for the country." If and when the environment is sufficiently inspiring, we may see many such people around.
I return to China's miracle. Other than the economic system itself, I rank two developments as truly miraculous. First is the explosive growth in the Yangtze River basin that stretched all the way into the mid-west, beginning around 1993. This took place during a period which began with the collapse of the RMB, 20% inflation followed by 3% deflation, and a fall in property prices by two-third or more. Second is the explosive rise in peasant income beginning around 2000, when deflation came to an end. I estimate that, from 2000 to 2007, the percapita income of peasants increased about 20% per year. Three out of four peasants of working age have floated to industrial and commercial employment. If this trend continues, it will take no more than 10 years for the average income of peasants to catch up with the medium income group living in the cities. Trends, of course, cannot be counted on, but if the trend continues, I estimate that in 20 more years China's economic status would amount to 10 Japans.
In closing, I must pay tribute to the man I once criticized. He is Zhu Ronji. As my teacher Armen Alchian often reminded me: it is results, not motivation, which measure success. The two noted miracles, which I rank above all others, both occurred during Zhu's tenure as China's economic navigator. Future history will not forget this man. Essentially what the new law says is that labor contracts are no longer free. They must follow stringent guidelines determined by the government. Over-time pay is doubled, room-and-board provided by the employer cannot be deducted from wages, all contracts must be in writing, holidays and benefits of workers must be such and such, labor unions are encouraged, firing procedures are modifiedall for the benefits of workers, and a tenure system similar to that found in US universities is introduced: a worker will automatically be granted a contract to retirement, if he or she has been employed by the same firm for 10 years.
Although the timing matches perfectly, I would not venture to say that China's stock market crashed as the result of the new labor law and the serious intent to enforce it as expressed in the March Beijing meetings. As Newton remarked, only God understands the behavior of stock markets. 38 Nor would I venture to say that the sharp fall in exports during January and February 2008, notably in toys and garments, was the result of the labor law. (The snowstorms which hit the country were the worst within memory.) However, I can say that some 120 factories owned by Koreans in a town in Shandong province quietly closed during the Chinese New Year holidays, so when the workers returned they found everything shut and no one around. The new law hurts old establishments more, so that thousands of factories closed down in traditional industrial districts, with multiplier effects going down the supply chain. Workers were sacked left and right. Many restaurants in the old industrial districts went bankrupt. There were protests in the streets.
37 张五常, 《新劳动法的困扰》 , 二○○七年十二月十三日发表于《壹周刊》。 38 After losing a fortune in the stock market, Newton said, "I can calculate the motions of heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people." See John Carswell (1960: 131, 199) .
Seeing that the industrial outlook has suddenly turned gloomy, a department in Beijing placed the blame on the sub-prime crisis and recession in the United States. But this is negated by the facts: exports of similar items from Vietnam, India, and Pakistan have been increasing. There is no question that the new labor law has triggered a shift in favor of other cheap-labor countries. Lower level industrial investors in China are moving out, especially to places like Vietnam. They will bring their clients along, when the factories now under construction are ready for operation.
It is inconceivable to me that Beijing is not aware of what is happening. The authorities must know. So why? Why did they insist on pushing the new labor law as late as March 2008, when the negative effects were becoming apparent to all and sundry? Except for some lawyers and a tiny fraction of the work force, everybody would lose. The governor of Guangdong succinctly stated that any government policy must consider its effects on workers, employers, and the state, and in his view the new labor law would hurt all three groups. He was apparently not welcome in the March Beijing meeting.
I can see very little special interests that can be promoted by the new labor law. Even the lawyers I talked to opposed it, saying the expected increase in legal business cannot compensate the staffing problems they will have to put up with. Considering the new law is introduced on the 30th anniversary of China's economic reform and the year of the Beijing Olympics, it is truly baffling.
I have three plausible explanations, and most likely it is a combination of all three, although in economic logic things do not add up. The first reason is that Beijing did not know that the incomes of poor peasants and low-level workers have been sharply rising since 2000, at rates which in my view are unmatched in history. However, workers earning less than RMB 1,600 per month do not have to report tax, and floating workers simply do not report, so their incomes are difficult to assess. More important is the fact that registered population in the villages remains large, although many people have floated away. If one divides the observed total income of peasant households with the registered population, an artificially low per-capita income is obtained.
In January 2004, two Chinese authors published a book which won international acclaim. This book reports that Chinese peasants are having a difficult time.
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A year later, the World Bank reported that the livelihood of Chinese peasants has deteriorated since the country joined the World Trade Organization. Such statements, coming at a time when peasant wealth and welfare was improving at the fastest rate in Chinese history, are irresponsible. Indeed, as recently as 3 March 2008, Justin Lin reported in the aforementioned Beijing meeting that the income 39 陈桂棣与春桃, 《中国农民调查》 , 二○○四年一月人民文学出版社。 distribution in China is becoming more and more unequal and unfair. This was the main issue of his report. 40 Justin is the man in charge of agricultural policy, so how could he not be aware that Chinese peasants have never had better days than now? How could he not know that in terms of percentage growth the income gap has been closing fast the past several years?
The new labor law is intended to help the poor, but on 17 January 2008 I published an article predicting this law would create a downward kink in the rising income curve for China's poor. 41 This kink is beginning to be obvious now! A second plausible reason why the new law was introduced is that President Hu has expressed the principle of a scientific approach to development. 42 No one can object to that, but unfortunately this principle has been interpreted by many to imply an intention to phase out low-tech labor-intensive activities. It should not be forgotten that the economic reform is meant to lift the masses out of poverty, and that for a country with a large population like China, embodied capital-augmenting technological progress requires labor of both high and low productivities competing and supporting from below. Finally, there is the bad influence of western economics. The so-called efficiency-wage theory, the validity of which is in doubt, 43 has been interpreted by returning Ph.D.s to mean that if workers are paid more they would produce more. I can accept the view that given two groups of identical and homogeneous laborers, the higher-paid group would tend to perform better. This is no more than saying that if a publisher doubles my writing fees, my articles would read better. But at what level would an employer want any given worker to perform? What about the lower-paid group? Why should the minimum payment be decided exogenously by the government? Returning at last to the main thesis of this paper, one must ask: What about the power of the competing xians? Though they had not been consulted before passing the new labor law, what about their resilience to unwarranted central intervention as I described? At this moment, most xians ignore the new law. However, it will be difficult to resist this time, for three reasons. First, there was a "soft" old labor law which by and large has not been followed or enforced. The new law draws attention to the old violations. Second, because of Article 14 of Other than what I have described, two outcomes are certain, for we already see them unfolding. The first is that enterprises would seek evasive contractual arrangements, not only with regard to labor but in corporate structure. Whatever happens, ultimately transaction costs would increase with detrimental effects on economic growth. Secondly, producers would increase automation and screen out less productive workers. For the moment, the majority of factories which are closing down are relatively small or "marginal". This would create the impression that Beijing has succeeded in promoting technological progress by reducing labor intensity, but what will happen is that technological progress shall be hindered by a weakening of labor support from below.
Beijing authorities today have apparently forgotten the motto of Deng Xiaoping which has served the reform process very well: Give it a try, and then take a look. They should try out the New Labor Contract Law in a few selected xians first, monitor and observe their performance, compare to other xians, before deciding what to do.
Because the situation in China is changing fast, I must point out that this epilogue is written on 8 April 2008. When drafting "The Economic System of China" in the summer of 2007, I was not fully aware that what I believe to be the most efficient of economic systems would soon be under threat. There were some danger signals: On a general level,
Beijing was increasing regulation of the country's xians (县). The situation changed dramatically in early 2008, when a New Labor Contract Law was introduced and the southern city of Dongguan was strictly enforcing it. What was regarded to be one of the world's leading manufacturing centers was economically shattered. Many Dongguan factories were forced to farm out product-parts to households or factories so small that the employer-employee relationship became vague. There was a partial return to the putting-out system popular in England before the (first) industrial revolution. Other factories simply gave up. Since 2008, there has not been a single case of significant foreign investment in Dongguan. Today, the New Labor Contract Law is no longer strictly enforced. In some areas, officials offer incentives to investors by declaring that the law has only a nominal status. Formally, however, it still exists. This episode demonstrates a marked contrast between China today and China in the 1980s and 1990s. It used to be that high-ranking officials would acknowledge policy errors openly. Now no such statements are heard.
Corruption has risen sharply, not because of inherent defects in the system, but because of a massive increase in government spending prompted by the 2008 global financial crisis. Officials everywhere love to spend public money, and the crisis gave Beijing a solid justification to do so. I was in the minority in suggesting that the crisis would not hurt China to any great extent. On 18 November 2008 I argued that only for already-committed public projects, it would be expedient to carry them out earlier. Two weeks later (2 December 2008), I warned that spending money recklessly under the circumstances would be disastrous. Then on 20 March 2009 I suggested that Beijing should halt the spending frenzy. All to no avail! The central government spent massively. Directly and indirectly, local governments were encouraged to spend even more. The exact total amount is not known. Various estimates suggest that over a period of five years, central and local governments committed three to five trillion US dollars to various projects. This kind of money tends to breed corruption, mainly because it encourages under-the-table kickbacks from contractors. Under ordinary market practice this would be regarded as over-the-table commissions, but in the case of kickbacks the amount is concealed. Even a modest estimate of a 10% cut of 3 trillion dollars, we are talking about three hundred billion dollars. With government project money, it is both easy and inviting to give and take such cuts. In all fairness, however, I do not believe that there exists a country which can avoid a great increase in corruption when government money showered down in abundance from a giant Friedman helicopter. Corruption is reported to have climbed in India too, and Europe reported likewise. Neither India nor Europe experienced an increase in government project money anywhere near the magnitude of China.
In "The Economic System of China," I wrote that highways constructed in the country over one year were long enough to span the entire United States. This rate was soon doubled. Literally hundreds of tunnels were drilled a year, and at what speed! It is said that taking the high-speed train from Guangzhou to Wuhan, one would spend more time inside tunnels than under the sky. In this construction craze there is one redeeming feature, however. Whereas in other countries a project would likely be halted halfway when corruption is discovered and then it would take years more to complete, in the case of China the projects are always completed when corruption is reported. Not only completed -they are beautifully executed. The high-speed train is supremely comfortable, and the new airports are spectacular. I have not the nerve to tell my Beijing friends that without the under-the-table kickbacks, we would not experience the phenomenal speed of project execution.
It is easy to see that the Keynesian multiplier floundered. The reason is that while inputs were drawn from the production of goods and services bearing immediate market values, project investments only promise income returns in the future. Wages have increased significantly as a result of crowding out, but the investments would yield little immediate returns to cover the rent-component of entrepreneurial contributions. Under such conditions, the multiplier would necessarily be lower for project investment than if the government simply dished out money to men and women in the street to spend.
The national debt -both central and local -has of course skyrocketed, and right now it is anybody's guess whether the beautifully executed projects would turn out to satisfy Fisher's condition and yield positive net present values. Highspeed railways have no doubt been built with bullet-train speed, but on checking a year ago I found that ticket income could not yet cover operational expenses, not to mention the interest cost. Total debt has therefore continued to rise. My gut instinct is that in due course, China will grow out of this debt burden. Many people think otherwise. A few nights ago, I saw an intelligent Chinese lady interviewed by BBC. She was apparently expert on facts and figures in China, and her view was that it is mathematically impossible for the country to get out of the woods.
It is mathematically possible, but the squeeze imposed on private borrowing has generated a real rate of interest exceeding 5% for such a long period, business failures have now reached an alarming rate. Hence the paradox: China, generally regarded the world's leading economic performer since the 2008 financial crisis, is ranked the poorest in stock-market performance during the same period.
Around 2009, local officials began to massage figures to boost the overall growth rate. Beijing is aware of this data inflation, although they may not be sure of the exact magnitude. If you ask me, I would not bet that right now, China's growth rate is still positive in per capita terms. It is the distribution system for local officials that prompted inflated reporting. But whereas in recent years the growth rate is overstated, in earlier periods it was understated. On balance, however, I think that China's total income and wealth is still understated. There is no denying the fact that economically the country has become strong.
In "The Economic System of China," I noted that that system needed some fine-tuning. What I had in mind was that the mechanism of xian income distribution should be modified and improved. Two matters concerned me in particular. First is an asymmetry between contribution and income that often defies rational explanation. There are xian officials who have contributed enormously but only received incomes of several hundred dollars a month. One official I know netted two hundred million dollars on a project when it was turned over to the market, but throughout his salary was only one thousand dollars a month. Because the project in question did not involve outside investment, there was no award money to the official-in-charge. A second matter of concern is that while award money is associated with outside funding, this is mainly tied to the offering of land at low prices as a lure to investors. When the availability of vacant land dwindles award money would also dwindle regardless of effort otherwise. Because of rapid growth, a number of the more popular xians are reaching or already reached the limit of land supply.
In the summer of 2013, I gave a talk to a gathering of xian officials. I focused on the asymmetry between contribution and income, and the consequences if and when land supply runs short. I argued that while there is no simple solution to these problems, turning the xians to corporations may be a way out. I explained that many cities in England and the United States are incorporated, but that in the case of China incorporating a xian would be far more complex because the entity must be genuinely business-oriented. When I suggested that this is a possibility Beijing ought to think about, the audience got very excited.
When writing this postscript, I must say that the economic outlook of China is not good. I am not highly pessimistic, because the Communist Party of China has a proven ability to make things happen. Right now, Beijing is busy executing an anti-corruption campaign, on a scale unheard of. From what I read or heard, the economic floundering discussed above is not yet a matter of prime concern to the authorities. They will come to realize the need for action soon. My main concern is that while special interests in China today are far more than 10 years ago, I have yet been able to see that the people now in charge of the economy have a good feel of the working of economic systems. For good economic policy-making a good feel is a must, far more important than formal knowledge of models, modeling, and so on.
In China, the period between 2001 and 2007 witnessed what must be the most spectacular economic take-off in history. What happened has called into question many of the growth theories propounded to date. For the purpose of economic analysis it is unfortunate that accurate data are not available, mainly because about half the labor force was floating at that time. During that period I happened to be on site, befriended by numerous investors and officials who shared their knowledge generously. What unfolded was truly spectacular and something that happens once in many many lifetimes. Note: This paper is dedicated to Ronald Coase, whose idea on the clear delineation of rights inspired the economic awakening of a great nation, and to celebrate the 30th anniversary of what must be the greatest program for economic reform in history.
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